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By George Friedman
During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, now-U.S. Vice President
Joe Biden said that like all U.S. presidents, Barack Obama would
face a foreign policy test early in his presidency if elected.
That test is now here.
His test comprises two apparently distinct challenges, one in
Afghanistan and one in Iran. While different problems, they have
three elements in common. First, they involve the question of
his administration's overarching strategy in the Islamic world.
Second, the problems are approaching decision points (and making
no decision represents a decision here). And third, they are playing
out very differently than Obama expected during the 2008 campaign.
During the campaign, Obama portrayed the Iraq war as a massive
mistake diverting the United States from Afghanistan, the true
center of the "war on terror." He accordingly promised
to shift the focus away from Iraq and back to Afghanistan. Obama's
views on Iran were more amorphous. He supported the doctrine that
Iran should not be permitted to obtain nuclear weapons, while
at the same time asserted that engaging Iran was both possible
and desirable. Embedded in the famous argument over whether offering
talks without preconditions was appropriate (something now-U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attacked him for during the
Democratic primary) was the idea that the problem with Iran stemmed
from Washington's refusal to engage in talks with Tehran.
We are never impressed with campaign positions, or with the failure
of the victorious candidate to live up to them. That's the way
American politics work. But in this case, these promises have
created a dual crisis that Obama must make decisions about now.
Iran
Back in April, in the midst of the financial crisis, Obama reached
an agreement at the G-8 meeting that the Iranians would have until
Sept. 24 and the G-20 meeting to engage in meaningful talks with
the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany
(P-5+1) or face intensely increased sanctions. His administration
was quite new at the time, so the amount of thought behind this
remains unclear. On one level, the financial crisis was so intense
and September so far away that Obama and his team probably saw
this as a means to delay a secondary matter while more important
fires were flaring up.
But there was more operating than that. Obama intended to try
to bridge the gap between the Islamic world and the United States
between April and September. In his speech to the Islamic world
from Cairo, he planned to show a desire not only to find common
ground, but also to acknowledge shortcomings in U.S. policy in
the region. With the appointment of special envoys George Mitchell
(for Israel and the Palestinian territories) and Richard Holbrooke
(for Pakistan and Afghanistan), Obama sought to build on his opening
to the Islamic world with intense diplomatic activity designed
to reshape regional relationships.
It can be argued that the Islamic masses responded positively
to Obama's opening -- it has been asserted to be so and we will
accept this -- but the diplomatic mission did not solve the core
problem. Mitchell could not get the Israelis to move on the settlement
issue, and while Holbrooke appears to have made some headway on
increasing Pakistan's aggressiveness toward the Taliban, no fundamental
shift has occurred in the Afghan war.
Most important, no major shift has occurred in Iran's attitude
toward the United States and the P-5+1 negotiating group. In spite
of Obama's Persian New Year address to Iran, the Iranians did
not change their attitude toward the United States. The unrest
following Iran's contested June presidential election actually
hardened the Iranian position. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remained president
with the support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while
the so-called moderates seemed powerless to influence their position.
Perceptions that the West supported the demonstrations have strengthened
Ahmadinejad's hand further, allowing him to paint his critics
as pro-Western and himself as an Iranian nationalist.
But with September drawing to close, talks have still not begun.
Instead, they will begin Oct. 1. And last week, the Iranians chose
to announce that not only will they continue work on their nuclear
program (which they claim is not for military purposes), they
have a second, hardened uranium enrichment facility near Qom.
After that announcement, Obama, British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy held a press conference
saying they have known about the tunnel for several months, and
warned of stern consequences.
This, of course, raises the question of what consequences. Obama
has three choices in this regard.
First, he can impose crippling sanctions against Iran. But that
is possible only if the Russians cooperate. Moscow has the rolling
stock and reserves to supply all of Iran's fuel needs if it so
chooses, and Beijing can also remedy any Iranian fuel shortages.
Both Russia and China have said they don't want sanctions; without
them on board, sanctions are meaningless.
Second, Obama can take military action against Iran, something
easier politically and diplomatically for the United States to
do itself rather than rely on Israel. By itself, Israel cannot
achieve air superiority, suppress air defenses, attack the necessary
number of sites and attempt to neutralize Iranian mine-laying
and anti-ship capability all along the Persian Gulf. Moreover,
if Israel struck on its own and Iran responded by mining the Strait
of Hormuz, the United States would be drawn into at least a naval
war with Iran -- and probably would have to complete the Israeli
airstrikes, too.
And third, Obama could choose to do nothing (or engage in sanctions
that would be the equivalent of doing nothing). Washington could
see future Iranian nuclear weapons as an acceptable risk. But
the Israelis don't, meaning they would likely trigger the second
scenario. It is possible that the United States could try to compel
Israel not to strike -- though it's not clear whether Israel would
comply -- something that would leave Obama publicly accepting
Iran's nuclear program.
And this, of course, would jeopardize Obama's credibility. It
is possible for the French or Germans to waffle on this issue;
no one is looking to them for leadership. But for Obama simply
to acquiesce to Iranian nuclear weapons, especially at this point,
would have significant diplomatic and domestic political ramifications.
Simply put, Obama would look weak -- and that, of course, is why
the Iranians announced the second nuclear site. They read Obama
as weak, and they want to demonstrate their own resolve. That
way, if the Russians were thinking of cooperating with the United
States on sanctions, Moscow would be seen as backing the weak
player against the strong one. The third option, doing nothing,
therefore actually represents a significant action.
Afghanistan
In a way, the same issue is at stake in Afghanistan. Having labeled
Afghanistan as critical -- indeed, having campaigned on the platform
that the Bush administration was fighting the wrong war -- it
would be difficult for Obama to back down in Afghanistan. At the
same time, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal,
has reported that without a new strategy and a substantial increase
in troop numbers, failure in Afghanistan is likely.
The number of troops being discussed, 30,000-40,000, would bring
total U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan to just above the number
of troops the Soviet Union deployed there in its war (just under
120,000) -- a war that ended in failure. The new strategy being
advocated would be one in which the focus would not be on the
defeat of the Taliban by force of arms, but the creation of havens
for the Afghan people and protecting those havens from the Taliban.
A move to the defensive when time is on your side is not an unreasonable
strategy. But it is not clear that time is on Western forces'
side. Increased offensives are not weakening the Taliban. But
halting attacks and assuming that the Taliban will oblige the
West by moving to the offensive, thereby opening itself to air
and artillery strikes, probably is not going to happen. And while
assuming that the country will effectively rise against the Taliban
out of the protected zones the United States has created is interesting,
it does not strike us as likely. The Taliban is fighting the long
war because it has nowhere else to go. Its ability to maintain
military and political cohesion following the 2001 invasion has
been remarkable. And betting that the Pakistanis will be effective
enough to break the Taliban's supply lines is hardly the most
prudent bet.
In short, Obama's commander on the ground has told him the current
Afghan strategy is failing. He has said that unless that strategy
changes, more troops won't help, and that a change of strategy
will require substantially more troops. But when we look at the
proposed strategy and the force levels, it is far from obvious
that even that level of commitment will stand a chance of achieving
meaningful results quickly enough before the forces of Washington's
NATO allies begin to withdraw and U.S. domestic resolve erodes
further.
Obama has three choices in Afghanistan. He can continue to current
strategy and force level, hoping to prolong failure long enough
for some undefined force to intervene. He can follow McChrystal's
advice and bet on the new strategy. Or he can withdraw U.S. forces
from Afghanistan. Once again, doing nothing -- the first option
-- is doing something quite significant.
The Two Challenges Come Together
The two crises intermingle in this way: Every president is tested
in foreign policy, sometimes by design and sometimes by circumstance.
Frequently, this happens at the beginning of his term as a result
of some problem left by his predecessor, a strategy adopted in
the campaign or a deliberate action by an antagonist. How this
happens isn't important. What is important is that Obama's test
is here. Obama at least publicly approached the presidency as
if many of the problems the United States faced were due to misunderstandings
about or the thoughtlessness of the United States. Whether this
was correct is less important than that it left Obama appearing
eager to accommodate his adversaries rather than confront them.
No one has a clear idea of Obama's threshold for action.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban takes the view that the British and
Russians left, and that the Americans will leave, too. We strongly
doubt that the force level proposed by McChrystal will be enough
to change their minds. Moreover, U.S. forces are limited, with
many still engaged in Iraq. In any case, it isn't clear what force
level would suffice to force the Taliban to negotiate or capitulate
-- and we strongly doubt that there is a level practical to contemplate.
In Iran, Ahmadinejad clearly perceives that challenging Obama
is low-risk and high reward. If he can finally demonstrate that
the United States is unwilling to take military action regardless
of provocations, his own domestic situation improves dramatically,
his relationship with the Russians deepens, and most important,
his regional influence -- and menace -- surges. If Obama accepts
Iranian nukes without serious sanctions or military actions, the
American position in the Islamic world will decline dramatically.
The Arab states in the region rely on the United States to protect
them from Iran, so U.S. acquiescence in the face of Iranian nuclear
weapons would reshape U.S. relations in the region far more than
a hundred Cairo speeches.
There are four permutations Obama might choose in response to
the dual crisis. He could attack Iran and increase forces in Afghanistan,
but he might well wind up stuck in a long-term war in Afghanistan.
He could avoid that long-term war by withdrawing from Afghanistan
and also ignore Iran's program, but that would leave many regimes
reliant on the United States for defense against Iran in the lurch.
He could increase forces in Afghanistan and ignore Iran -- probably
yielding the worst of all possible outcomes, namely, a long-term
Afghan war and an Iran with a nuclear program if not nuclear weapons.
On pure logic, history or politics aside, the best course is
to strike Iran and withdraw from Afghanistan. That would demonstrate
will in the face of a significant challenge while perhaps reshaping
Iran and certainly avoiding a drawn-out war in Afghanistan. Of
course, it is easy for those who lack power and responsibility
-- and the need to govern -- to provide logical choices. But the
forces closing in on Obama are substantial, and there are many
competing considerations in play.
Presidents eventually arrive at the point where something must
be done, and where doing nothing is very much doing something.
At this point, decisions can no longer be postponed, and each
choice involves significant risk. Obama has reached that point,
and significantly, in his case, he faces a double choice. And
any decision he makes will reverberate.
Attributed to www.stratfor.com
29th Sept 09
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