By Fred Burton and Ben West
The assassination of senior Hamas militant leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh
on Jan. 19 is still generating a tremendous amount of discussion
and speculation some six weeks after the fact. Dubai's police
force has been steadily releasing new information almost on a
daily basis, which has been driving the news cycle and keeping
the story in the media spotlight. The most astounding release
so far has been nearly 30 minutes of surveillance camera footage
that depicts portions of a period spanning the arrival of the
assassination team in Dubai, surveillance of al-Mabhouh, and the
killing and the exfiltration of the team some 22 hours later.
By last count, Dubai police claim to have identified some 30
people suspected of involvement in the assassination; approximately
17 have been convincingly tied to the operation through video
footage either as surveillants, managers or assassins, with the
rest having only tenuous connections based on information released
by the Dubai police. In any case, the operation certainly was
elaborate and required the resources and planning of a highly
organized agency, one most likely working for a nation-state.
Pre-Operation
While the 22-hour period depicted in the video showcased the
tactical capabilities of the various teams, it hardly tells the
whole story. In order to pinpoint the location of al-Mabhouh on
the day of his killing, the organization responsible for this
operation would have had to have tracked al-Mabhouh for months,
if not years. This can be done in three ways: technical surveillance,
utilization of human sources and physical surveillance.
Technical surveillance of al-Mabhouh would include monitoring
his e-mail, telephone calls and other forms of electronic communications
such as online credit-card transactions and travel reservations.
This could reveal his physical location and future plans, which
would allow the assassination team to anticipate his location
and prepare well ahead of time. With such a large team involved
in the assassination, careful coordination and planned movements
would have been required to ensure that all members were in place
without attracting attention.
But technical surveillance has limitations. An experienced operative
like al-Mabhouh (who had been the target of two previous assassination
attempts in as many years) would most likely have taken precautions
that would have limited his electronic visibility. The operational
team likely used human sources with close ties to al-Mabhouh who
could corroborate the information and possibly influence the target's
movements, putting him in place for the operation. Human sources
could have included al-Mabhouh's colleagues within Hamas or a
member of a rival group such as Fatah. (Three Palestinians suspected
of being members of Fatah were arrested by Dubai authorities in
connection with the assassination, indicating that the group may
have provided human intelligence to the organization responsible
for al-Mabhouh's assassination.) Other people could have been
recruited using a number of incentives (including cash) without
their knowing the consequences of their assistance. Both the technical
and human intelligence operations would have been run by intelligence
officers operating abroad and at locations separate from the operational
team.
According to Dubai police, physical surveillance was conducted
by members of the operational team during al-Mabhouh's previous
trips to the United Arab Emirates. Physical surveillance is a
critical part of any effective assault (whether it's a clandestine
intelligence operation or a car-jacking) because it gives the
operatives an opportunity to become familiar with their surroundings
and recognize their target in his or her "natural" environment.
Once all this homework was done to establish al-Mabhouh's normal
routines and determine his approximate location and duration of
his stay in Dubai, the intelligence-collection process moved into
the deployment phase and an operational team was sent into action.
The Operation
Prior to Mabhouh's arrival, surveillance teams set up in the
airport and at different hotels to make sure they could obtain
a visual confirmation of their target. Based on their intelligence
of his prior trips to Dubai, planners placed teams in two hotels
to wait for al-Mabhouh approximately an hour before his arrival.
They also had a surveillance team waiting for him at the airport
to follow him as soon as he entered the country and report his
movements to the rest of the team. While it wasn't captured on
video, we suspect that a mobile surveillance group tracked al-Mabhouh
from the airport by car. To help ensure a successful outcome,
the operational team used overwhelming force to prevent the target
from ever seeing the same face twice. When it was established
that al-Mabhouh was staying at the Al Bustan Rotana, the team
responded by abandoning their other posts and directing their
focus to that hotel.
Once al-Mabhouh was identified, the team locked on to him at
the hotel and started initiating further steps in the operation.
The first surveillance team watched al-Mabhouh register at the
front desk and then followed him to his room, noting the target's
specific room number. This was relayed to other members of the
team, who then placed a reservation for the room across the hall
from al-Mabhouh, which gave them direct access to their target.
The selection of the room is very interesting for two reasons.
First, it was directly across the hall from al-Mabhouh's room,
giving the team a perfect spot from which to monitor his movements.
Second, the room was just behind the video camera for that floor
and the camera was trained on the emergency stairwell exit, which
allowed the assassination team to carry out the attack on his
room without being filmed.
Meanwhile, down in the hotel lobby, surveillance teams were rotating
to monitor the target's movements in and out of the hotel. At
one point, a surveillant is seen following al-Mabhouh out to the
street to relay by cell phone the type of vehicle he had entered.
These surveillants, operating in teams of two, used disguises
such as hats, sunglasses, beards and work-out gear to establish
a cover for action and better conceal their identities. While
many members of the operational team were identified on closed-circuit
television (CCTV), hats and sunglasses helped distort their images
and reduce the already low risk of being recognized by the target
or any protective team during the operation.
Another necessity in any operation like this is communications.
Surveillance video of the team involved in this operation shows
them using cell phones to send text messages and talk to other members
of the team. According to reports from Dubai police, the cell phones
used in the operation were dialed to an Austrian number, likely
the operations and support center for the team on the ground and
any others involved in the operation. This might have been an open
conference line into which all members of the operational team could
dial to monitor the movement of their target. It is unlikely that
the center was actually in Austria; it probably used a proxy phone
line to mask its true physical location.
Assassination and Exfiltration
At approximately 8:30 p.m. on Jan. 19, after al-Mabhouh returned
to his hotel room from a meeting, the assassination team moved
in. It was important to carry out the killing at a time and in
a manner that would give the team the maximum window of opportunity.
They suspected that al-Mabhouh was in for the night, which meant
that nobody would miss him until early the following afternoon,
giving the team ample time to flee the country. The team carried
out the assassination smoothly, with video surveillance showing
only two operatives casually talking outside the elevator (a cover
for monitoring the hall for possible distractions) -- in other
words, nothing out of the ordinary. The assassination team members
also exhibited no unusual behavior when they departed the scene.
Demeanor is extremely important, and the ability of the team to
act calmly and naturally and not catch the attention of security
guards monitoring CCTV ensured that the act remained a secret
until hotel cleaning staff found the body more than 17 hours after
the entire team had departed Dubai.
The assassination team also killed al-Mabhouh in a way that apparently
confounded medical examiners trying to determine the cause of
death, delaying the announcement of a criminal case for nine days.
This delay gave the operational team ample time to cover its tracks,
possibly by using third- and fourth-country border crossings,
additional false identities and safe-houses, making it much harder
for Dubai authorities to track team members to their ultimate
destinations. This confusion appears to have been created by the
use of a muscle relaxant called succinylcholine (also known as
Suxamethonium), which, if used in large enough quantities, can
cause the heart to stop, making it appear that the victim died
of cardiac arrest. The drug also has a very short half-life, meaning
that traces would degenerate and virtually disappear shortly after
injection, making it ideal for covert operations such as this
one.
The team was not able to pull off the operation with complete
anonymity -- it is virtually impossible to operate in a modern
environment without leaving some kind of electronic trace. The
Dubai police were able to use video surveillance from the airport,
hotels and a nearby shopping center to trace back the movements
of the operatives and establish their identities according to
the passports that they used. These later proved to be fraudulent
passports from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany and France
-- but they were extremely well-made fraudulent passports that
were discovered later, only after video surveillance prompted
closer scrutiny; customs officials were unable to detect this
when the operatives were arriving or departing. Moreover, the
credit cards used by several members of the operation team were
linked to a company called Payoneer. The company's CEO is a former
member of Israel Defense Forces special operations, and Payoneer
has financial backing from a company based in Israel.
Dubai police have announced that they retrieved DNA evidence
from at least one of the members on the assassination team and
fingerprints from several others, giving authorities pieces of
evidence that are unalterable, unlike a passport. However, DNA
evidence is only helpful when it can be compared against an exemplar.
If Dubai police are unable to find a match to the DNA sample or
a fingerprint, then these clues will offer little immediate help.
The passports also provide little immediate help in terms of
tracking down the suspects. The discovery that fraudulent British,
Irish, German and French passports were used has created a diplomatic
problem for Israel (Mossad is understandably at the top of the
list of suspects), which raises the profile of the operation considerably.
This is certainly not what a clandestine operation is supposed
to do. Although the operatives will probably never be found and
handed over to UAE authorities, the fact that so many details
of the assassination have been made public jeopardizes the anonymity
that is supposed to surround this kind of operation.
Potential Consequences
Al-Mabhouh was hardly a likable character. As a senior Hamas
military commander, arms smuggler and liaison to Iran, he was
already on the terrorist watch lists in the countries that have
complained about the use of fraudulent passports. Public indignation
is a necessary and expected reaction from these countries to save
diplomatic face, but when it comes down to it, there would be
few incentives to seriously punish Israel, if it indeed sponsored
the hit. The police of Dubai and the United Arab Emirates, rightfully
frustrated that they are tasked with solving an unsolvable case,
will still probably not miss al-Mabhouh. Their efforts to stir
up outrage over the assassination are likely fueled by their desire
to save face in the Arab world, where the Palestinian cause is
of high rhetorical importance but little strategic importance.
The fact is that the high level of complexity involved in this
assassination, along with the smoothness with which it was carried
out, is evidence that the operation was undertaken by an elite
covert force, the likes of which could only be sponsored by a
nation-state. The ability to conduct preliminary intelligence
collection, to muster a large and coordinated team of skilled
operatives, to fabricate passports to an exacting degree, to successfully
exfiltrate all members of the team -- all of this requires a significant
and well-funded effort that, we believe, exceeds the current capabilities
of any non-state terrorist group. It is worth noting here that
the most impressive aspect of the operation was the team's tradecraft
and demeanor. All the members of this team were professionals.
Indeed, with so much time having already elapsed, and if the
operation was sponsored by a nation-state, it is highly improbable
that any of the operatives involved will ever be caught. However,
countries around the world are offering their assistance in the
case, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada
and Australia. Few officials from these countries actually believe
any of the operatives will be apprehended, but that is not the
real reason to participate in the investigation. What officials
are really looking for are the granular details of how this group
of assassins and surveillants operated. These details are extremely
valuable in ongoing counterintelligence efforts by countries to
thwart foreign intelligence agencies operating on their home turf.
The information can provide clues to past and future cases, and
it can be used to build databases on covert operatives, so that
if any of these people show up unexpectedly at an airport, hotel
or embassy in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia
or elsewhere, the alarms can be sounded more quickly.
Attributed to www.stratfor.com
4th March 2010
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