U.S.
President Barack Obama outlined a set of new policies Jan. 7 in
response to the Dec. 25, 2009 Northwest Airlines bombing attempt,
which came the closest to a successful attack on a U.S. flight since
Richard Reid's failed shoe-bombing in December 2001. As in the aftermath
of that attempt, a flurry of accusations, excuses and policy prescriptions
have emanated from Washington since Christmas Day concerning U.S.
airline security. Whatever changes actually result from the most
recent bombing attempt, they will likely be more successful at pacifying
the public and politicians than preventing future attacks.
At the heart of President Obama's policy outline were the following
key tactics: pursue enhanced screening technology in the transportation
sector, review the visa issuance and revocation process, enhance
coordination among agencies for counterterrorism (CT) investigations
and establish a process to prioritize such investigations. While
such measures are certainly important, they will not go far enough,
by themselves, to meaningfully address the aviation security challenges
the United States still faces almost nine years after 9/11.
Holes in the System
For one thing, technology must not be seen as a panacea. It can
be a very useful tool for finding explosive devices and weapons
concealed on a person or in luggage, but it is predictable and
reactive. In terms of aviation security, the federal government
has consistently been fighting the last war and continues to do
so. Certain practical and effective steps have been taken. Hardening
the cockpit door, deploying air marshals and increasing crew and
passenger awareness countered the airline hijacking threat after
9/11; requiring passengers to remove their shoes and scanning
them prior to boarding followed Reid's 2001 shoe-bombing attempt;
and restrictions on liquids and gels followed the 2006 trans-Atlantic
plot. Not enacting these measures would have meant not learning
from past mistakes, and they do ensure that unsophisticated "copycat"
attackers are not successful. But such measures -- even those
that are less technological -- fail to take into account innovative
militants, who are eager and able to exploit inevitable weaknesses
in the process.
Even advanced body-imaging systems like the newer backscatter
and millimeter-wave systems now being used to screen travelers
cannot pick up explosives hidden inside a person's body using
condoms or tampons -- a tactic that was initially thought to have
been used in the Aug. 28 assassination attempt against Saudi Deputy
Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. (It is now believed
that the attacker in that case used an underwear bomb like the
one used in the Christmas Day attempt.) Moreover, X-ray systems
cannot detect explosives cleverly disguised in carry-on baggage
or smuggled past security checkpoints -- something that drug smugglers
routinely do.
Preventing attacks against U.S. airliners would require unrealistically
invasive and inconvenient measures that the airline industry and
American society are simply not prepared to implement. El Al,
Israel's national airline, is one international carrier that conducts
thorough searches of every passenger and every handbag, runs checked
luggage through a decompression chamber and has two air marshals
on each flight. The airline also refuses to let some people (including
many Muslims) on board. While these practices have been successful
in preventing terrorist attacks against the airline, they are
not in line with American and European culture and President Obama's
insistence that measures remain consistent with privacy rights
and civil liberties. It is also economically and politically unfeasible
for major U.S. airlines operating hundreds of flights per day
from hundreds of different cities to impose measures such as those
followed by El Al, an airline with fewer planes and a smaller
area of operation.
And as long as U.S. airport security relies on screening techniques
that are only moderately invasive, there will be holes that innovative
attackers will be able to exploit. While screening technology
is advancing, there is nothing in the foreseeable future that
would be able to do more screening with less invasiveness. The
U.S. prison system grapples with the same problem, and even there,
where inmates are searched far more invasively than air travelers,
contraband is still able to flow into facilities.
Focusing on the visa issuance and revocation process also leaves
holes in the system. The Christmas Day bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
had been given a multiple-entry U.S. visa, which allowed him to
travel to the United States. When Abdulmutallab's father expressed
concerns to officials at the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria, on
Nov. 19, 2009, that his son might have been involved with Yemen-based
Islamist militants, Abdulmutallab's name and passport number were
sent from the U.S. Embassy in Abuja to Washington and placed in
the "Visa Viper" system, which specifically pertains
to visas and terrorist suspects. His name and passport number
were also logged into the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment,
but not the "no-fly" list.
This standard operating procedure (which does not automatically
result in a visa revocation) passed the responsibility from the
CIA agents who spoke to Abdulmuttalab's father on to the U.S.
State Department, where agents unfamiliar with the specifics of
the case did not, apparently, decide to act on it. In hindsight,
the decision not to take the father's warning more seriously appears
to be a glaring mistake, but in context it seems less obvious.
The father's tip was vague, with little indication of what his
son was up to or, more important to U.S. CT agents, that he was
planning even to travel to the United States, much less attack
a U.S. airliner.
Intelligence Limitations
The possibility of yet another jihadist suspect emerging in the
Middle East does not pose an existential threat to the United
States, so this raises the third challenge: prioritizing CT investigations.
Vague warnings such as the tip from Abdulmuttalab's father spring
up constantly throughout the world and CT investigators have to
prioritize them. Only the most serious cases get assigned to an
investigator to follow up on while the rest are filed away for
future reference. If the same name pops up again with more information
on the threat, then more action is taken. U.S. CT agents are most
concerned about specific threats to the United States, and with
no actionable intelligence that Abdulmutallab was plotting an
attack against the United States, his case was given a lower priority.
Nevertheless, not acting immediately on the father's vague threat
proved to be a near-fatal move. This highlights the danger of
the unsophisticated, ill-trained militant, referred to in U.S.
CT circles as a "Kramer jihadist" (after the bumbling
character in the sitcom "Seinfeld"). By himself, a Kramer
jihadist poses a minimal threat, but when combined with a trained
operative or group, he can become a formidable weapon. Abdulmutallab
had been radicalized, but there is nothing to suggest that he
had extensive jihadist training or any tactical expertise. He
was simply a willing agent with a visa to the United States. When
put in the hands of a competent, well-trained operator (such as
those involved with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), a Kramer
jihadist can be outfitted with a device and given a support network
that could supply him with transportation and direction to carry
out an effective attack. There are simply too many radical Islamists
in the world to investigate each one, but immediately revoking
visas to keep suspects off U.S. airliners until they can be investigated
further is a fairly simple process and would be an effective deterrent.
Finally, the lack of coordination among agencies in CT investigations
is an old problem that dates back well before 9/11. This challenge
lies in the fact that the U.S. intelligence community is broken
up into specific agencies -- each with its own specific jurisdiction
and incentive to leverage its power in Washington by controlling
the flow of information. This system ensures that no single agency
becomes too powerful and self-interested, but it also fractures
the intelligence community and bureaucratizes intelligence sharing.
National Counterterrorism Center
In order to investigate a case like Abdulmutallab's, agents from
the CIA must work with agents from the FBI, and the State Department
is tasked with coordinating the requests for information from
various foreign governments (whose information is not always reliable).
For foreign threats specifically aimed at airlines, agents from
the Transportation Security Administration, Federal Aviation Administration,
Office of Director of National Intelligence, and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement must be notified. Rallying and coordinating
all the appropriate actors and agencies to respond to a threat
requires careful bureaucratic maneuvering and presents numerous
opportunities to be bogged down at every step. Certainly, the
more overt the threat, the easier it is to move the bureaucracy,
but a case as opaque as Abdulmutallab's would not likely inspire
a quick and decisive follow-up.
The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was created
to aggregate threats from various local, state and federal agencies
all over the world in order to streamline the threat-identification
and investigation process. However, the additional bureaucracy
that was generated with the formation of the NCTC has essentially
canceled out any benefit that the center might have contributed.
When it comes down to it, modern airliners -- full of people
and fuel -- are extremely vulnerable targets that can produce
highly dramatic carnage, characteristics that attract militants
and militant groups seeking global notoriety. And Abdulmutallab's
efforts on Christmas Day certainly will not be the last militant
attempt to bring an airliner down. As security measures are changed
in response to this most recent attempt, terrorist planners will
be watching closely and are sure to adapt their tactics accordingly.
Attributed to www.stratfor.com
14th January 10
